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Abstract: The conciliation committee is the ultimate inter-cameral dispute settlement 
mechanism of the ordinary (former codecision) legislative procedure of the European 
Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? Are the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers on an equal footing?  We argue that the institutional set-up of the 
committee is bias in favour of the Council. We offer evidence in support of this proposition 
by estimating, through Wordfish, the similarity between the documents of almost all the 
dossiers that reached conciliation up to February 2012. This evidence suggests that, in 
almost seventy percent of times, the final agreement is more similar to the position of the 
Council. As expected, the Parliament has been more successful after the reform of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and in dossiers where the Council decides by qualified majority 
voting. The Parliament also benefits if the rapporteur comes from a large party because a 
veto threat is more easily executable. In line with König et al. (2007), the support from the 
Commission is crucial to parliamentary success. Moreover, when national administrations 
are more involved in implementation than the Commission, parliamentarians are less 
accommodating than ministers because they value much more legislative design as control 
mechanism. Weaker or no support is found for other factors. 
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Introduction 
In the codecision procedure, now the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union 
(EU), the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers employ a conference 
committee, called the conciliation committee, to settle ultimately the differences that may 
arise during the adoption of legislation. Who wins in these negotiations, the Council or the 
Parliament?  Are they on an equal footing? What are the factors that determine bargaining 
success within the committee? 
Conference committees are frequently employed in bicameral legislatures to solve 
outstanding disagreements after a bill has been shuffled back and forth between the two 
chambers. How these committees operate eventually determines the balance of power 
between the chambers. As Tsebelis and Money (1997: 118) observe, ‘the composition of 
the conference committee, its decision-making rule, and the set of bicameral restrictions are 
critically important to the results of bicameral bargaining’. 
In most formal models of EU codecision making, the success of a chamber is determined 
by an arbitrary assumption about the first mover or a random recognition rule (Crombez 
1997; Crombez 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Steunenberg 1997; Steunenberg 1994). 
These models are primarily interested in identifying an equilibrium that can be used for 
inter-procedural comparisons. For Napel and Widgrén (2006) instead, the institutional set-
up is biased in favour of the Council because its pivotal member is likely to have an higher 
disagreement value that the respective member in the Parliament. However, the most 
systematic empirical research on this issue has found that, at least as far as the 1999-2002 
period is concerned, these negotiations favour the Parliament (König et al. 2007). 
Moreover, the Strasbourg assembly is more likely to win over the Council when it is more 
proximate to the status quo, it is cohesive
2
 and it has the support from the European 
Commission. 
In this work, we will confirm some of these results and take issue with others. We will 
argue that the conciliation committee is a conference committee by half, in the sense that it 
is a meeting between a full upper chamber, on the one side, and a delegation of a lower 
chamber. This, in combination with a unit rule to take decisions,
3
 is likely to bias outcomes 
in favour of the Council. We offer evidence in support of this proposition by examining 
almost all the dossiers that reached conciliation from the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty to February 2012 and estimating, through Slapin and Proksch’s (2008; 2009) 
Wordfish algorithm, the similarity between the committee’s joint texts and the documents 
produced by the two chambers. This evidence suggests that, in almost seventy percent of 
times, the final agreement is more similar to the position of the Council. As expected, the 
Parliament has been more successful after the reform of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in 
dossiers where the Council decides by qualified majority voting. In line with Konig et al. 
(2007), the support from the Commission is crucial to parliamentary success, but 
negotiations are also affected by differences among conferees in the availability of ex-ante 
                                                 
2
 Low cohesiveness in the Council is also beneficial for the Parliament (König et al. 2007). On the other hand, 
the brief case study of Tsebelis and Money (1997: 176-9, 204) leans toward greater influence of the Council. 
Hagemann and Høyland (2010) offer evidence of greater influence of the Council in codecision in the earlier 
stages of the procedure. They argue that ‘the Council has conditional agenda-setting power due to a change in 
the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament’ (811). 
3
 Agreements are approved under closed rule by concurrent majorities in the two chambers (Tsebelis and 
Money 1997: 176-9). 
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and ex-post mechanisms employed to oversee execution across implementation paths. 
Weaker or no support is found for other factors. 
Getting to conciliation 
The codecision procedure was introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and later 
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. With the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in December 2009, it was renamed the ordinary legislative procedure. From only 
fifteen in 1993, the number of policy areas that are regulated through this procedure has 
now increased to eighty. The Treaty of Lisbon for instance extended its coverage to several 
subfields, the most important of which relate to justice and home affairs. Accordingly, the 
number of bills increased dramatically: from 153 acts adopted in the 1993-9 legislative 
term to 454 in the 2004-9 term (European Parliament 2009, 8). 
According to Article 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, after the 
first reading by the Parliament of a proposal by the Commission, the Council may either 
adopt the measure in the wording approved by the Parliament or adopt its own common 
position if it disagrees with its fellow chamber. Within three months, the Parliament can 
reject or amend the Council’s text by absolute majority.4 After further three months, if the 
Council does not approve the parliamentary amendments,
5
 the presidents of the Council 
and of the Parliament convene a meeting of the conciliation committee to resolve the 
remaining differences between the two institutions. In other words, conciliation is 
necessary when either a qualified majority of or, for amendments rejected by the 
Commission, the whole Council has failed to approve the amendments inserted by the 
Parliament after reading its common position.  
The conciliation committee is composed of members of the Council and Parliament in 
equal number. Since the size of the two delegations equals the number of member states, 
the Council delegation is essentially the Council, where the chief negotiations are normally 
the deputy permanent representatives chaired by the minister holding the presidency 
(Rasmussen 2005; Rasmussen 2008; Tsebelis and Money 1997). For the Parliament, its 
rules of procedure prescribe the composition of its delegation to reflect the whole assembly 
by political groups. Once the conference of presidents determines the number of members 
per group, such members are then appointed by the groups themselves. The delegation must 
include the chair and the rapporteur of the committee responsible for the case at hand as 
well as three permanent members chosen from among the vice-presidents. 
The objective of conciliation is to produce, within six weeks, a joint text supported by a 
qualified majority of Council delegates and an absolute majority of parliamentary 
delegates. The Commission takes part to the conciliation negotiations without a right to 
vote. If agreement is found on a joint text, this document is then voted upon within six 
weeks, under closed rule and by qualified and simple majority in the Council and 
Parliament respectively. Unless government changes have incurred in the meanwhile, the 
Council vote is perfunctory because the composition of this institution and of its 
conciliation delegation coincides. For the Parliament instead, the combination of closed 
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 If the Parliament fails to act, the proposal is deemed to have been adopted in the wording of the Council first 
reading. The Parliament can also approve this document by simple majority. No act is adopted in case of 
rejection. 
5
 The Council approves by qualified majority those amendments that are supported by the Commission, 
unanimously the unsupported amendments.    
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rule with simple majority provides the conciliation delegation with a significant agenda 
setting power vis-à-vis the plenary. 
This procedure has changed over time. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council could 
not conclude the procedure and adopt a final act after the first parliamentary reading, nor 
could the Parliament do so at its second reading. The definitive adoption was a Council 
prerogative. More important for our purposes, if negotiations within the conciliation 
committee failed, the Council could make a final take-it-or-leave-it offer to the Parliament, 
which had to muster an absolute majority to halt irrefutably the proposed measure. This last 
procedural step strengthened, at least in principle, the negotiating hand of the Council 
(Garrett 1995; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996), but the adoption of a rule of procedure, stating 
that the parliamentary leadership would table a motion to reject in such circumstance, has 
presumably limited the Council’s potential gains (Hix 2002; Kasack 2004). 
A second, less noted, procedural change was the modification of the voting rule in the 
Council. The Treaty of Maastricht, for instance, specified that measures in the fields of 
culture as well as the multiannual framework programme in research and technological 
development were to be adopted following the codecision procedure, but the Council will 
have to act unanimously. The Council’s bargaining hand was presumably stronger in these 
cases as it could credibly threaten rejection if just a single minister was not happy with the 
proposal at hand. Qualified majority voting was extended to the framework programme by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam and to cultural policy by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Table 1 illustrates the frequency with which the conciliation committee has been used. 
During the fourth and fifth parliamentary term, this intra-cameral dispute settlement 
mechanism has been employed once every five Commission’s proposals. Even allowing for 
learning and adaptation, this indicates significant inter-institutional conflict. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam, that made early agreements possible, did not seem to ease up tensions, at least 
in the first five years. On the other hand, there has been a significant drop in the 
employment of the committee over the last two legislative terms. This could indicate better 
working of the mechanisms of inter-institutional cooperation. The lower incidence is also a 
product of the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to the majority of EU policy 
areas, thus inflating the denominator. In sum, conciliation appears to becoming now a 
proper mechanism to settle disputes, which is used only occasionally. 
< TABLE 1 APPROX HERE > 
Conciliation bargaining 
Disagreement value 
Under which conditions should we expect actors to be more or less accommodating when 
they sit at the negotiating table of the conciliation committee? In case of symmetry between 
two bargainers, the Nash cooperative solution is driven by the best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement (Dixit and Skeath 1999, 523–9). The same is true in a non-
cooperative setting of alternating offers, such as the Rubinstein model (1982), if negotiators 
attach different values to the disagreement. The value to carry on bargaining increases in 
one’s disagreement value and decreases in the opponent’s disagreement value (McCarty 
and Meirowitz 2007, 285–6). The utility that actors attach to the status quo drives the 
solutions of spatial models of codecision bargaining as well (Crombez 1997; Crombez 
2001; Garrett 1995; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Steunenberg 
1997; Steunenberg 1994). More specifically, Napel and Widgrén (2006) model the 
negotiations within the conciliation committee and predict the Council to be significantly 
5 
 
more influential than the Parliament. The source of this power resides on the fact that, 
under symmetric preference distributions, the Council pivotal member under qualified 
majority voting is likely to attach a higher value to the status quo (i.e. be more 
conservative) that the median voter in the Parliament. 
Unfortunately, corroborating evidence is hard to come by. Extending and replicating the 
work of Thomson et al. (2006), Thomson (2011) finds that a model based on Nash 
bargaining solution which assumes that the disagreement outcome is equally and highly 
undesirable for all bargaining actors has greater explanatory power than a similar model 
with a reference point (or status quo). In other words, including an estimate of the utility 
associated with failure worsens the predictive power of a model of EU decision-making. 
Closer to our interest, results appear contradictory. On the one hand, Costello and Thomson 
(2011) confirm that being closer to the status quo does not enhance the chances of success 
of the Parliament in codecision. On the other hand, König et al. (2007) find that proximity 
to the status quo allow a chamber to exert greater influence in conciliation negotiations. We 
have reasons to doubt this latter result however. These scholars have employed a variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the Parliament is located closer to the status quo, -1 if it is 
located closer to the Council, and zero if no information was available. Accordingly, zero 
means that the two institutions attach the same value to the status quo. Missing data have 
therefore been treated as highly informative. The impossibility to locate the status quo - the 
majority of observations in this study - has been considered as univocally indicating that 
Council and Parliament attach the same value to the disagreement outcome. We are not 
sure whether this is the best method to treat missing information, especially given the 
availability of maximum likelihood or multiple imputation approaches (Allison 2001). 
How can we explain these results? For Achen (2006: 102), the (negative) utility associated 
with the reference point underestimates the cost of disagreement. Besides measurement, 
there are analytical and observational reasons as well. Since legislative bargaining has 
significant opportunity costs, a resource-constrained and risk-averse proposer has an 
incentive to initiate only bills on which she is reasonably certain that the majority of 
legislators values more than the status quo. In an information rich environment, this 
estimation should not be too difficult. We therefore tend to observe mostly proposals where 
the cost of disagreement is high across the board and, therefore, it cannot explain outcomes. 
Certainly, withdrawals and rejections indicate that misjudgement occurs, but failed 
proposals are excluded from these analyses because there is no document on which 
estimating bargaining success. A failure is observed. This exclusion reduces further the 
explanatory power of the status quo as these are clear cut cases where disagreement is 
valued more than agreement. With all these caveats in mind, we will nevertheless include in 
the inferential analysis a proxy of the disagreement value. 
Institutions 
Let us consider other factors. We have argued that, in case of symmetry, both cooperative 
and non-cooperative bargaining solutions are driven by the disagreement value. But there is 
no symmetry within the conciliation committee. On the one hand, we have a fully 
represented collective actor, the Council, where each member can submit amendments. The 
agreed text is then subject to a perfunctory confirmation vote by the same actors involved 
in the committee negotiation. As Rasmussen (2008: 88) reminds us, the Council delegation 
is the Council. On the other hand, we have a delegation of a collective actor, the 
Parliament, where delegates can propose, individually, amendments during the negotiation 
and, collectively, a joint text to their whole chamber under closed rule. 
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This set up makes the negotiations within each collective institution represented in 
conciliation asymmetric. Negotiation inside the Parliament, that is, between the 
parliamentary delegation and the whole assembly, is a case of majority-rule bargaining 
under closed rule. Negotiation inside the Council is a case of (super)majority-rule 
bargaining under open rule. These differences are best analysed employing Baron and 
Ferejohn’s (1989) extension of the Rubinstein model. This extended model indicates that 
members of the parliamentary delegation should enjoy significantly more proposal power 
vis-à-vis their colleagues in whole assembly than members of the Council delegation vis-à-
vis their own colleagues. Council delegates are hampered by both open rule and 
supermajority.
6
 This difference between the two delegations is common knowledge and 
structural; and its consequence can be interpreted through the counterintuitive lenses of the 
Schelling (1960) conjecture. Since members of the Council delegation are significantly 
more constrained, they are likely to demand a more accommodating stance from the more 
powerful parliamentary delegation. Counter intuitively, the power that these delegates 
enjoy in conciliation vis-à-vis their colleagues in the plenary is a source of structural 
weakness in the conciliation negotiations. Outcomes of these negotiations should therefore 
be biased in favour of the Council.
7
 
This advantage could vary from case to case as well. Where the Treaty prescribes 
unanimity in the Council, each member’s proposal power within this institution is even 
more inhibited, further strengthening the Council vis-à-vis the parliamentary delegation (N. 
McCarty and Meirowitz 2007: 294; Tsebelis 2002). Now it is the least accommodating 
Council member that will make demands on the parliamentary delegation. Baron and 
Ferejohn’s model also indicates that, in majority bargaining under closed rule, proposal 
power increases in the size of the assembly because more legislators can be played off one 
another. But, as we have argued, this increased power should further weaken the 
parliamentary delegation in the conciliation negotiations.  
Lastly, considering Garrett and Tsebelis’ (1996) argument, we also control for the 
Amsterdam Treaty reform in the inferential analysis. 
Uncertainty, veto threats and reputation 
Unanimity in the Council and a larger assembly are two additional structural features that 
could work against the Parliament. But what are the instruments at its disposal to redress 
this structural weakness? What can the Parliament do to strengthen its position in the 
conciliation negotiations?
8
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 Permanent representatives, the de facto negotiators, are even more constrained because they cannot promise 
and deliver compromises without the consent of their ministers (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 204). 
7
 Tsebelis and Money (1997: 176-9) note also how its unit rule to take decisions as well as the limited 
restrictions imposed by the parent chambers (negotiations cover the entire bill, and it is possible to find 
innovative solutions and to trade across issues) offer the committee the capacity to reach many different 
compromises. This can clearly be detrimental to the assembly. However, greater emphasis has been put on 
germaneness over the years. The two delegations bargain over a four column working document listing the 
second reading of the Parliament and the common position of the Council as well as the Council’s opinion on 
the Parliament position and the updated comments of the parliamentary delegation. 
8
 We will not consider two factors: representativeness of the parliamentary delegation and cohesiveness of the 
chambers. Representativeness matters, as Tsebelis and Money (1997: 110-8) remind us, but Rasmussen 
(2008) finds that the delegation tends to reflect the composition of the whole assembly by political groups, as 
prescribed by the rules of procedures. There are exceptions though; the largest parties tend to be 
overrepresented and, in six out of the 86 procedures analysed, the delegates’ positions differed from those of 
their party colleagues in the assembly. For codecision cases in general, Costello and Thomson (2011) find that 
a representative rapporteur is beneficial to the Parliament (whether her report was amended by the plenary, 
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Given its structural disadvantage, we may wonder what motivates the Parliament to move 
to conciliation. One factor could work in its favour: incomplete information. Consider a 
proposer facing, with a given probability, two types of receivers (moderate and extremist) 
with low and high disagreement values respectively. Her take-it-or-leave-it offer is more 
accommodating if the probability of dealing with an extreme receiver is high and her utility 
difference between an aggressive and an accommodating offer is small (McCarty and 
Meirowitz 2007: 295). This simple set up indicates that actors benefit from manipulating 
beliefs about an actor’s type (i.e. reputation). A moderate receiver is better off if the 
proposer beliefs that she is an extreme type. These incentives are best analysed through 
signalling models. Although none has been developed with the conciliation committee in 
mind, several are on offer. In an influential model on veto threats, Matthews (1989) shows 
that the most informative equilibrium consists of an accommodating receiver signalling his 
true type and other receivers issuing a veto threat to whom the proposer offers concessions. 
Importantly, there is no guarantee for this equilibrium to exist. In a dynamic model of 
reputation building and bargaining over multiple bills, McCarty (1997) shows how a 
receiver has an incentive to reject a first-period proposal to build a reputation as an extreme 
type in order to obtain a better outcome from a second-period proposal. Given these 
incentives, the proposer may be more accommodating in the first period to avoid rejection 
on reputational grounds. This dynamics holds if receiver and proposer are sufficiently 
divergent. 
In conciliation, there is no predetermined receiver or proposer and uncertainty may work 
either way. However, since the Council is fully represented, uncertainty about the type of 
Council the parliamentary delegation is dealing with is plausibly lower than the uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                                    
another factor based on an agency-drift type of argument, does not lend support however). The delegation 
could be more accommodating towards the Council than the whole assembly; or, it could be more recalcitrant. 
However, while an accommodating delegation may be detrimental to the assembly by agreeing on a joint 
document that is farther from the assembly position; it is unclear why a recalcitrant delegation should produce 
the same outcome. Actually, a chamber may have an incentive to create a recalcitrant committee as it could be 
a more effective intercameral negotiator (Gailmard and Hammond 2011). Unfortunately, it is very hard to 
determine the nature of the delegation because it ultimately depends on (a speculation on) the location of the 
status quo. Assume that we know the location of the median voter in the delegation and in the assembly. To 
determine whether the delegation is accommodating or recalcitrant we need to know the position of the 
(unanimity or qmv)-pivot in the Council. But to determine this, we ultimately need to know, or speculate on, 
the position of the status quo. 
Related to representation are König et al.’s (2007) findings that higher parliamentary cohesiveness diminishes 
Council’s and increases Parliament’s success rates, and that lower Council cohesiveness increases 
parliamentary success. König et al. argue that ‘the winset of less cohesive non-unitary institutional actors is 
larger. Because more cohesive non-unitary institutional actors accept fewer alternatives that beat the status 
quo, the bargaining outcome is expected to shift towards them’ (289-90). However, the relation between 
cohesiveness and the size of the winset of the status quo is highly conjectural and changes direction with 
different decision rules. Consider cohesion as the inverse of the radius r of a Y-centred yolk of a majority-
voting collective player. The Y-centred wincircle, with radius d + 2r (where d is the distance between Y and 
the status quo), defines an upper bound - there are no points of the winset of the status quo located outside it. 
By definition a decrease in cohesiveness increases the wincircle, but ‘it is not always the case that an 
increased wincircle will entail an increase in the size of the winset of the status quo’ (Tsebelis 2002: 48). 
Tsebelis provides an example of an increase in winset as the wincircle shrinks (i.e. as cohesiveness increases). 
Albeit anecdotal, the rejection by the Parliament of the joint text on biotechnological inventions seems to 
originate from a diminished cohesiveness (and smaller winset) after the European elections (Rittberger 2000: 
563). For collective actors deciding by qualified majority, the so-called q-circle determines the radius and 
centre of the wincircle. Lower cohesion (i.e. larger yolk) is actually more likely to reduce the size of the 
wincircle and winset, although one can find counterexamples (Tsebelis 2002: 53). 
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about the type of full assembly the Council delegation is facing.
9
 Potential benefits for the 
Parliament may lie here. The conciliation process can be plausibly described as a situation 
whereby the Council (proposer) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the full Parliament 
(receiver), conditional to the support from a parliamentary delegation under open rule.  
Since dossiers get to the conciliation stage because the positions of the Council and the 
Parliament differ significantly, even the most accommodating parliamentary delegation 
would have the incentive to issue a veto threat, at the risk of producing an uninformative 
babbling equilibrium (Matthews 1989). Nevertheless, under which conditions is a threat of 
parliamentary veto likely lead to concessions from the Council? Unfortunately, formal 
models do not offer much.
10
 We pay particular attention to the leading players involved in 
the conciliation negotiations - the president of the Council and the rapporteur of the 
Parliament - because they are widely recognized as being influential relay actors (e.g. 
Farrell and Héritier 2004; Rasmussen 2005). Rapporteurs from large parties or in a position 
of leadership in the Parliament are more likely to make good on veto threats because they 
have more resources to sanction defection in the assembly. Consequently, they should be 
able to extract more concessions from the Council. The ability to issue credible threats by 
rapporteurs from parties represented in the Council may be instead undermined primarily 
because their allegiance is also with the national parties in government. If the president of 
the Council comes from new member states, it is plausible to suggest that she would be 
more easily subject to belief manipulation as she is still learning the ropes of negotiation. 
She may also be facing higher reputational costs of a failed negotiation (Hosli, Mattila, and 
Uriot 2011). This could work in favour of the parliamentary assembly. Finally, McCarty’s 
(1997) model suggests the Council to be more accommodating at the beginning of the 
parliamentary term, there may be non-trivial reputational incentives operating within the 
assembly at large.  
There is no agreement on the impact of these factors in the literature. Costello and 
Thomson (2011: 341) also expect large party rapporteurs to be more successful because 
they ‘can credibly claim to be more in touch with the views of the majority of MEPs’ (see 
also Farrell and Héritier 2004). König et al. (2007) argue for the opposite. A smaller party 
rapporteur would extract more concessions as she would hold more extreme views.
11
 Both 
works fail to find party allegiance to have an impact. Costello and Thomson (2011) also 
find that the Parliament has less success in codecision when the rapporteur is in a position 
of leadership. They argue that ‘rapporteurs who are political leaders will find it difficult to 
convince their counterparts [i.e. the Council] that they are unable to compromise’ (342). 
However, why shouldn’t this rapporteur take advantage of her greater control of the 
assembly to extract more concessions from the Council instead? 
Implementation 
We conclude considering how expectations about the implementation of a measure may 
affect the resolve of the Council and Parliament. This factor is ignored by the literature on 
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 Benedetto (2005) argues that bargaining inside the Parliament is more transparent than bargaining inside the 
Council and this should work in favour of the latter institution. This is the case prior to getting to conciliation. 
During these negotiations however, the whole Council is in full view, whereas the whole assembly is not. 
10
 Ingberman and Yao (1991) analyse the consequences of a receiver successfully issuing a commitment 
threat of the sort: “I'll veto any bill that is not in the set C” (362), but this model is silent on the circumstances 
in which the receiver has the incentive and ability to make such a threat (Cameron 2000: 197). 
11
 Both are predominantly preference-based arguments. König et al. (2007: 291) state that ‘sending agents 
with extreme positions is advantageous for the (median) institutional actor’ (but, operationally, they consider 
rapporteurs from the liberal party as extremists). On the issue of representativeness see note 8. 
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legislative bargaining, but re-election minded politicians are ultimately concerned about the 
outcomes of their decisions: how the implementation of a measure delivers benefits to their 
constituency. We will consider two issues. 
First, another significant finding of König et al. (2007) is the importance of the opinion of 
the Commission in determining the relative success of the Parliament and Council in 
conciliation. The Commission may be able to exercise influence under favourable 
circumstances, when it enjoys some informational advantages or manages to assemble 
support from non–legislative actors (König et al. 2007; Moravcsik 1999; Pollack 2003; 
Rasmussen 2003). But perhaps, aside from informal influence, the views of the 
Commission matter simply because its formal role in implementation matters. The 
Commission is directly in charge of implementation when legislative provisions confer 
upon it the power to take policy decisions. Even when no provisions foresee its 
involvement, this supranational bureaucracy is entrusted with the power to initiate 
proceedings against possible infringements by national administrations (e.g. Börzel 2001; 
Pollack 2003). 
This leads us to our second issue. The relative involvement in policy execution of the 
Commission and national administrations vary across measures, and the ex-ante and ex-
post mechanisms
12
 for overseeing implementation that are available to ministers and 
parliamentarians vary systematically as well (Franchino 2007: 240-4). Where the 
Commission is the main implementer, each minister must rely on the collective will of the 
Council to exercise control over the supranational executive, for instance via the 
comitology procedures. For national execution, ministers, as head of their departments, are 
instead individually in charge of overseeing implementation and they have at their disposal 
a wider array of ex-post control mechanisms. Parliamentarians are in the opposite position. 
They have at their disposal a greater array of ex-post mechanisms when a measure is 
mostly implemented by the single Commission rather than the several national authorities. 
Unsurprisingly, compared to ministers, parliamentarians prefer greater involvement of the 
latter at the expense of the former (Franchino 2007: 285-6). Because oversight via 
legislative design is more important to parliamentarians than ministers when national 
authorities are the primary implementers, we should expect them being less accommodating 
at the legislative stage. Because ex-post oversight is collective rather than individual when 
the Commission is the primary implementer, we should expect ministers being less 
accommodating at the legislative stage. 
Text-based measures of legislative bargaining success 
There are essentially two methods to measure success in legislative bargaining. The first 
one is based on interviewing key participants in the decision-making process. With the help 
of expert interviews, scholars identify the key cleavages underlying the adoption of a bill 
and estimate, for instance, the positions of the actors involved, the saliency they attach to 
each controversy as well as the location of the status quo. This approach has been the basis 
for important contributions in the study of EU legislative politics (e.g. Costello and 
Thomson 2011; König et al. 2007; Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson 2011). There is a limit 
however on how far back in time you can go and still produce valid estimates, both because 
memory fades and the availability of experts diminishes. For instance, Thomson et al. 
(2006) quite reasonably select only proposals pending in either 1999 or 2000. Additionally, 
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 Legislative design is an ex-ante control mechanism over implementation, while interpellations and inquiries 
are examples of ex-post control mechanisms (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002). 
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because it is hard to replicate the measurement process, reliability may be a problem. 
Multiple experts and documentary evidence are however used to validate the data. 
The second approach is based on comparing documents and producing measures of 
similarity. For instance, Tsebelis et al.’s (2001) study on the success of parliamentary 
amendments compares documents of the Commission and the Council with documents of 
the Parliament and produces an ordinal measure of the extent to which parliamentary 
amendments are adopted by the other institutions. This technique allows scholars to go 
quite far back in time, while the measurement process can be more easily replicated. 
However, even though several coders are employed, reliability may still be an issue. 
Since we want to analyse the full history of conciliation negotiations, we will employ the 
second approach. To minimize reliability problems and facilitate replication, we use Slapin 
and Proksch’s (2008; 2009) computer-based Wordfish scaling algorithm. Wordfish 
estimates positions based on word frequencies in text documents on a single dimension. 
Frequencies are assumed to be generated by a Poisson process, hence the stochastic 
component of the model is  
                     , 
whereas the systematic component is 
       (          ).  
where     is the count of word j in document i,   and   are document and word fixed 
effects respectively, β is an estimate of a word specific weight capturing the importance of 
word j in discriminating between positions, and ω is the estimate of document i's position. 
The systematic component is estimated through an expectation maximization algorithm. 
This procedure has several qualities, which are well explained by Slapin and Proksch 
(2008); it has also some problematic features though. It constrains positions on a single 
dimension, estimated by the parameter ω. The fact that there tends to be a privileged 
dimension of conflict in bicameral bargaining brings some solace (Tsebelis and Money 
1997: 90), but more than one dimension may persist in these negotiations (König et al. 
2007). 
Our estimates are based on three official documents: the second reading of the Parliament, 
the Council common position and the joint text.  In Appendix A, we explain in detail how 
the original documents have been treated to produce the data on which the Wordfish 
procedure is run. In Appendix B, we examine the validity of these estimates comparing 
them with those produced using five documents (adding, therefore, the Commission 
proposal and the first reading of the Parliament), hand-coding and expert interviews. 
Dataset and variables 
As illustrated in Table 1, 184 codecision dossiers have reached the conciliation stage since 
the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty to February 2012. On three occasions, the 
committee failed to produce a joint text. Because we cannot produce a measure of 
bargaining success, these dossiers drop out from our dataset. The documents of the dossiers 
on trans-European transport networks (COD/1994/0098) and on the Socrates financial 
framework (COD/1997/0103) differ only with regard to maps or figures. They are not 
amenable to our textual analysis and they drop out as well. In sum, the final dataset 
comprises 179 dossiers, which include, from Commission proposal to joint text, 537 
11 
 
documents.
13
 The policy areas most frequently covered are environment, internal market 
and transport. 
We take the perspective of the Parliament and we measure its bargaining success in a given 
dossier d as follows 
 
             {
     |         |   |        | 
     |         |   |        |
 
EP success takes the value of 1 if the absolute difference between the ω estimates for the 
second parliamentary reading and the joint text is smaller than the difference between the 
estimates for the Council common position and the joint text. 
We consider the following explanatory factors. As far as institutional features are 
concerned, parliamentary bargaining success should be negatively affected in dossiers 
where the Treaty prescribes unanimity for Council’s decisions. We include a variable 
Unanimity which takes the value of one in these circumstances. To account for the 
Amsterdam Treaty reform, which may have strengthened the Parliament, we include 
Codecision II that takes the value of one if committee negotiations have taken place after 1 
May 1999. Lastly, to account for Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) result that a larger 
membership should work against the Parliament, we include the variable MEPs, measuring 
the size of the assembly at the time of the adoption of the joint text by the committee. 
Moving on to uncertainty and veto threats, we have argued that rapporteurs from large 
parties or in a position of leadership within the Parliament may service better their 
assembly. Large party rapporteur takes the value of one if the rapporteur is from either the 
European People’s Party or the Party of European Socialists, while, as in Costello and 
Thomson (2011: 348), Leader rapporteur takes the value of one if the rapporteur held a 
leadership position. Rapporteurs from national parties that are represented in the Council 
may instead be less effective in extracting concessions. Government rapporteur takes the 
value of one if the rapporteur belongs to a national party that is in government at the time of 
adoption of the joint text. Beliefs about parliamentary types may be more easily 
manipulated when a Council president comes from a new member state. President state 
seniority is the natural logarithm of the number of completed years the country of the 
president has been an EU member at the time of adoption of the joint text. It should be 
negatively associated with parliamentary success. 
The reputational incentives discussed by McCarty (1997) are measured by the number of 
completed months between the beginning of the parliamentary term and the adoption of the 
joint text (Term length). The variable should be negatively associated with success if these 
incentives are more powerful at the beginning of term.  
As far as implementation is concerned, the influence of the Commission in codecision is 
measured by the share of parliamentary amendments that are rejected by this institution 
(Commission rejection). Lastly, because national administrations are relatively more 
involved in implementation than the Commission in case of directives, we use the indicator 
Directive, taking the value of one for this type of instrument, to measure the relative 
involvement of the two sets of implementers. If oversight via legislative design is more 
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 PreLex and EurLex were the primary sources but, for dossiers prior to the V legislative term, we had to 
collect documents from either the Official Journal or the public registers of the Parliament and the Council. 
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important to parliamentarians than ministers in these circumstances, we should expect this 
variable to be positively associated with parliamentary success. 
We conclude with two last factors. Notwithstanding our earlier discussion on the 
disagreement value, we include a variable, New act, which takes the value of one if the 
measure is not amending prior legislation. A negotiating failure in these circumstances 
would leave the Parliament empty-handed as there would be no EU law regulating the issue 
at hand. National governments would lose the benefits of EU-wide harmonization but their 
national regulatory capacity would be unaltered. We should expect the Council to benefit if 
indeed the disagreement value of ministers is higher than that of parliamentarians. Lastly, 
some measures are part of the same legislative package and are likely to share common 
features. We decided to control for this aspect with a variable, Package, that takes the value 
of one if dossiers either specifically mentions that are part of a package or have the same 
date of adoption of the joint text and same responsible parliamentary committee. Deals 
within the Council across measures of the same package could make this institution less 
amenable to compromise. Table 2 provides a summary of these variables with some 
descriptive statistics. 
< TABLE 2 APPROX HERE > 
Parliamentary success in conciliation committee negotiations 
Overall, conciliation negotiations are biased against the Parliament. The estimate of the 
joint text is closer to the position of the Parliament in only 54 of the 179 dossiers. In each 
legislative term, the joint text has been on average more similar to the common position 
than to the second parliamentary reading. The best performance for the Parliament was 
during the fifth term where 33 out of the 86 dossiers reaching conciliation produced joint 
texts that were more similar to its reading. In Table 3, we show the results of binomial tests 
with an epiphenomenal conciliation committee as null hypothesis (i.e. where the probability 
of parliamentary success is 0.5, a split-the-difference outcome). The probability that the 
expected frequency of success (k) in case of an epiphenomenal committee exceeds the 
observed frequency of success is above 99 percent in most cases. In other words, the 
Parliament significantly underperforms in these negotiations. 
< TABLE 3 APPROX HERE > 
In the earlier days, the joint text differed from the Parliament second reading and from the 
Council common position more than the extent to which these latter two documents 
differed from each other.
14
 The frequency of these cases has diminished over time however. 
They were the majority of observations in the third and fourth legislative term, but they 
have not exceeded thirty percent ever since. This could indicate that, over time, the two 
chambers are relying on conciliation as a more proper dispute settlement mechanism. 
What determines parliamentary success? Table 4 lists the results of the estimation of 
binomial models with a probit link function.
15
 Institutions matter. The probability of 
parliamentary success decreases by between 24.9 and 26.7 percentage points when the 
Council decides by unanimity. This decision rule confers a veto power to the Council 
member that is the least accommodating towards the demands of the Parliament. This 
weakness clearly emerges from the data. Additionally, the probability of success has 
increased by between 14.9 and 18 percentage points after the reform of the codecision 
                                                 
14
 In other words, for any given dossier, |         |              and |        |              . 
15
 We employ a probit link because EP success reflects an underlying interval variable. Hence, its cumulative 
distribution is normal. 
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procedure introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Despite evidence to the contrary (Hix 
2002; Kasack 2004), it seems that these changes have actually strengthened the 
Parliament’s hand. This is in line with Garrett and Tsebelis’ (1996) analysis of 
parliamentary powers under the first version of codecision. The size of the parliamentary 
assembly appears instead irrelevant. 
< TABLE 4 APPROX HERE > 
The results from the belief-manipulation expectations are weaker. We do not find evidence 
that rapporteurs in a position of leadership can extract more concessions from the Council. 
Costello and Thomson’s (2011) opposite expectation is also disconfirmed. Moreover, the 
Parliament does not benefit if the rapporteur is from a party represented in the Council. If 
instead she comes from a large party, the probability of parliamentary success increases by 
between 13.1 and 14.9 percentage points. Costello and Thomson (2011) put more emphasis 
on representation to explain this outcome. We have argued that large party rapporteurs can 
rely on greater resources to make good on veto threats and, therefore, they can be more 
successful.  
Moving on, there is weak evidence that Council presidents coming from newer member 
states are more accommodating toward the Parliament, perhaps because their beliefs are 
more easily manipulable. In 1998, Greece has been a member of the EU for seventeen 
years, while Austria just joined the three years earlier. If a Greek rather than an Austrian 
minister presided over the Council in the second semester of that year, the likelihood of 
parliamentary success would lower by 13.2 percentage points. 
Reputational incentives clearly do not seem to operate within the assembly at the beginning 
of a term as McCarty’s (1997) model suggests. Actually, there is weak evidence to the 
contrary. A Parliament facing elections in six months is 7.9 percentage points more likely 
to win in conciliation than a Parliament six months into its term. A weak learning process 
may be at place here. 
Implementation instead matters. If the Commission decides to reject all of the second 
reading amendments of the Parliament, rather than only half of them, the chances that the 
Parliament would win in conciliation diminishes by 14.4 percentage points. This is in line 
with the finding of König et al. (2007), although we tend to prefer a causal explanation 
based on the formal role entrusted upon the Commission in implementation rather than on 
informal bargaining resources. Certainly, the two causal stories are not mutually exclusive 
and may be related. 
Results also indicate that the probability of parliamentary success increases by 19.5 
percentage points in case of directives. When national administrations are more involved in 
implementation than the Commission is, parliamentarians are less accommodating because 
legislative design is the primary control mechanism at their disposal. On the other hand, 
ministers are more accommodating because they can rely on a wide array of ex-post control 
mechanisms. In other words, parliamentarians value legislative design as control 
mechanism much more than ministers do. 
Finally, the probability of parliamentary success diminishes by 12.5 percentage points 
when next acts are negotiated. In these circumstances, a more accommodating Parliament 
may indeed indicate that its members attach a lower disagreement to the measure at hand 
than the one assigned by ministers. In other words, a negotiating failure is more costly to 
parliamentarians. 
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Conclusion 
From the standpoint of the Parliament, this study offers solace and annoyance. Solace 
because the Amsterdam Treaty reform appears to have delivered the benefits the Parliament 
expected and because the phasing-out of unanimity from Council proceedings has 
strengthened the hand of the assembly in conciliation negotiations. Annoyance because the 
set-up of the conciliation committee remains structurally biased against the Parliament. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, it is the strength of the parliamentary delegation vis-à-vis the 
full assembly that is the source of the latter’s weakness vis-à-vis the Council. Likewise, it is 
the weakness of each minister vis-à-vis her colleagues that is the source of strength for the 
whole Council. 
Despite this structural weakness, getting to conciliation is not a foregone conclusion. The 
Parliament has managed to negotiate a joint text that is closer to its second reading in 30.2 
percent of dossiers that have reached conciliation. This proportion increases to 37.6 percent 
in the current setting (i.e., post-Amsterdam Treaty procedure and majority voting in the 
Council). What else explain parliamentary success? We have some support for theories that 
put emphasis on uncertainty and reputation. A veto threat by a rapporteur belonging to a 
large party is more executable and may induce the Council to be more accommodating. 
Evidence about the importance of implementation is more robust however. Of whom the 
Commission takes side matters because, we contend, its role in implementation is far from 
trivial. Politicians cannot ignore the effective delivery of a measure’s benefits. 
Additionally, when national administrations are more involved in implementation than the 
Commission, because legislative design is much more valued as control mechanism by 
parliamentarians than ministers, the former are less accommodating than the latter. 
The Parliament could also take advantage of other weapons, such as explicitly setting 
credible restrictions over the set of acceptable solutions (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 176). 
Indeed, the self-imposed rules of representativeness of its delegation, which Rasmussen 
(2008) finds to be operating well, could actually be counterproductive if interpreted through 
the lenses of intercameral bargaining (Gailmard and Hammond 2011). We have noted the 
difficulties in determining the nature of the parliamentary delegation, but an area of future 
research could be to understand if the Council’s negotiating stance influences the selection 
of parliamentary delegates. 
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Table 1: The incidence of conciliation     
EP legislative term Codecision proposals Conciliation negotiations Incidence (%) 
IV (1994-9) 270 67 24.8 
V (1999-2004) 482 86 17.8 
VI (2004-9) 541 24 4.4 
VII (2009-) 270 7 2.6 
Total 1563 184 11.8 
Source: OEIL database, accessed on 29 February 2012.   
Note: Three conciliation negotiations failed to produce a joint text, one in the IV Parliament, 
one in each the VI and VII Parliament. The Parliament has rejected four joint texts.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics         
Variable Description Mean Standard dev. Min Max 
  Dependent variable         
EP success = 1 if |         |   |        | . 0 otherwise 0.3 0.46 0 1 
  Institutions         
Unanimity = 1 if Council unanimity is required. 0 otherwise 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Codecision II = 1 if Amsterdam Treaty procedure. 0 otherwise 0.65 0.48 0 1 
MEPs Number of MEPs 639.13 54.69 518 785 
  Veto threats and reputation         
Leader rapporteur = 1 if rapporteur in leadership position. 0 otherwise 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Large party rapporteur = 1 if rapporteur from EPP or PSE. 0 otherwise 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Government rapporteur 
= 1 if rapporteur from party in government. 0 
otherwise 
0.4 0.49 0 1 
Presidency state seniority ln(no. of membership years of president country) 3.11 0.8 1.1 3.93 
Term length No. of months into parliamentary term 80.84 41.69 8 147 
  Implementation         
Commission rejection Share of EP amendments rejected by Commission 0.46 0.31 0 1 
Directive = 1 if directive. 0 otherwise 0.64 0.48 0 1 
  Other factors         
New act = 1 if new act. 0 otherwise 0.56 0.5 0 1 
Package = 1 if part of package. 0 otherwise 0.27 0.45 0 1 
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Table 3: Frequency of parliamentary success     
    EP legislative term 
    IV V VI 
EP success 54 13 33 6 
N 179 59 86 23 
z-statistic -5.31 -4.30 -2.16 -2.29 
Pr (k>= EP success) 1.000 1.000 0.989 0.995 
Note: One-sided binomial probability tests; k is the expected frequency in case of H0=.5 
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Table 4: Determinants of parliamentary success   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Institutions       
Unanimity -1.043* -1.222** -1.200** 
  (0.541) (0.560) (0.546) 
Codecision II 0.471* 0.606** 0.634** 
  (0.251) (0.259) (0.266) 
MEPs -0.153 -0.175 -0.195 
  (0.217) (0.231) (0.234) 
Veto threats and reputation       
Leader rapporteur   0.190 0.257 
    (0.242) (0.256) 
Large party rapporteur   0.497** 0.476** 
    (0.225) (0.236) 
Government rapporteur   0.0417 -0.0483 
    (0.215) (0.240) 
President state seniority   -0.198 -0.269* 
    (0.140) (0.151) 
Term length   0.456 0.582* 
    (0.281) (0.300) 
Implementation       
Commission rejection     -1.015** 
      (0.396) 
Directive     0.706*** 
      (0.251) 
Other factors       
New act -0.364* -0.362* -0.433* 
  (0.208) (0.216) (0.246) 
Package -0.237 -0.318 -0.328 
  (0.244) (0.262) (0.282) 
Constant 0.460 0.362 0.596 
  (1.334) (1.547) (1.646) 
        
N 179 179 179 
Log-pseudolikelihood -102.8 -98.49 -90.74 
Wald chi2 11.79 21.16 38.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Dependent variable: EP success.     
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Appendix A From official documents to Wordfish-usable data 
The official documents of the two institutions and of the conciliation committee need to be 
standardized and processed in order to become usable data for Wordfish. We deleted 
unnecessary parts, for example references to the author (Council, Parliament or conciliation 
committee), the competent directorate-general or subunit of the Commission and the 
number of pages. Abbreviations referring to units of measurement, mathematical or 
chemical formula, irrelevant footnotes, such as those referring to international conventions 
or EU legislation, and acronyms of international organizations or institutions were removed 
with the use of Notepad++, a text editing program. The same program was used to delete 
non-English words referring to national institutions.
16
 
We then extensively reviewed the documents and corrected the mistyped and misspelt 
words,
17
 employing also the spelling and grammar check of Microsoft Word. Extensive 
review was necessary because Microsoft Word tool detects mistyped, rather than misspelt, 
words. For example, a word ‘form’ that should be ‘from’ is not detected because it is 
correctly written, even though it has a different meaning. Moreover, the tool is unable to 
detect words which contain numbers (e.g. ‘col1ect’ instead ‘collect’). 
The documents were then converted into txt files and run through JFreq, a program that 
removes numbers and stopwords (e.g. ‘and’, ‘then’, ‘but’) as well as other recurrent words 
in legislative texts (‘article’, ‘annex’, ‘paragraph’, ‘whereas’, ‘OJ’)18 and stems the 
remaining ones according to the English dictionary. JFreq creates a term-document matrix 
in comma-separated value format that can be uploaded by Wordfish. 
Appendix B Validation 
We have compared our estimates with those derived from three alternative procedures: 
Wordfish estimation employing five official documents, hand-coding and expert surveys. In 
this appendix, we report the results of this validation exercise. 
Comparison with EP success estimates based on five documents 
According to Slapin and Proksch (2008), the stability of the word parameters improves if 
the estimation is performed using more and longer documents. We do not have a problem 
of length in our case, but we should consider the possibility in including five documents in 
the estimation procedure, namely adding the Commission proposal and the first reading of 
the Parliament.
19
 Note that this is not how the conciliation committee operates. The first 
two documents are ignored. Despite some freedom of manoeuvre (Tsebelis and Money 
1997: 176-9), negotiations tend to be germane, with the two delegations bargaining over a 
four-column working document listing the second reading of the Parliament and the 
common position of the Council, along with the updated positions of the two delegations. 
                                                 
16
 This is because we employed JFreq stemming process which relies on the English dictionary. We kept 
however Latin and foreign words that are commonly used in the English lexicon, such as inter alia, mutatis 
mutandis and leitmotiv. 
17
 Because we had to scan older documents, which were unavailable in electronic format, and employ an 
optical character recognition software, several words were indeed mistyped or misspelt. 
18
 Stopwords and recurrent words are uninformative because they do not discriminate across documents. 
Moreover, they make the estimation procedure more inefficient. The file listing stopwords and recurrent 
words is uploaded it into JFreq. 
19
 Using documents from different dossiers is meaningless because it implies imposing a single dimension 
upon different policy areas. 
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We have produced the ω estimates of the second reading of the Parliament, the common 
position of the Council and the joint text using five documents, and computed the variable 
EP success as explained in the main text. This variable is positively and significantly 
correlated with the EP success measure based on three documents, but the correlation is not 
substantively large (Spearman's correlation coefficient rho is 0.3380, p < 0.001). 
Conciliation negotiations are biased against the Parliament according to this measure as 
well. The estimate of the joint text is closer to the position of the Parliament in only 74 of 
the 179 dossiers.  In Table 1A, we show the results of binomial tests with an 
epiphenomenal conciliation committee as null hypothesis. The probability that the expected 
frequency of success, in case of an epiphenomenal committee, exceeds the observed 
frequency is above 99 percent in the full sample and the fourth legislative term. There are 
some important differences as well tough. The probability of parliamentary success is not 
significantly less than 0.5 in the fifth and sixth terms. The five-text estimation procedure 
picks up then a strengthening of the Parliament over time (not because of Codecision II 
though, as its effect is insignificant) or, perhaps, finds it harder to distinguish between the 
last three documents as legislators become more selective in relying on conciliation. 
< TABLE 1A APPROX HERE > 
What else can explain these differences? And, more importantly, which measure is more 
valid? If changes have occurred during a procedure, the first two documents may be so 
different from the last three that it would be meaningless to impose a single dimension 
upon all five texts. Several variables we examined
20
 do not explain this difference. Two 
seems relevant however. First, as the share of parliamentary amendments rejected by the 
Commission decreases, the two measures diverge. This could indicate greater parliamentary 
intervention and, thus, difference across the five legal texts. Imposing a single dimension 
could therefore be problematic. Second, the two measures diverge when the Council 
decides by unanimity. The five-document estimate displays a split-the-difference outcome 
(six parliamentary wins out for fourteen cases), while the three-document estimate displays 
a poor parliamentary performance (only one parliamentary win). Certainly, selecting a 
measure on the basis of whether it corroborates our expectation is questionable, but a 
measure indicating equal power between Parliament and Council when the latter decides by 
unanimity raise doubts. Below we discuss how hand-coding estimates also correlate more 
with Wordfish estimates based on three rather than five documents. On balance, the former 
procedure seems to produce more valid measures. 
Comparison with hand-coded estimates 
Because Wordfish has never been used to extract policy positions from legislative 
documents, we have compared its estimates with those derived from hand-coding. We 
randomly selected twenty legislative dossiers
21
 and compared the joint text with the second 
parliamentary reading and the Council common position. 
We coded more than five hundred modifications, roughly following Tsebelis et al.’s 
(2001). First, we determined whether the wording of the joint text provisions could be 
easily associated with the wording of the relevant provisions in either the reading of the 
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 Such as a change in procedure, rapporteur, Commission or commissioner responsible as well as the number 
of months passed between the parliamentary first reading and the Council common position. 
21
 These are: COD/2005/0191; COD/2004/0175; COD/2003/0168; COD/2001/0257; COD/1998/0336; 
COD/1998/0289; COD/1998/0195; COD/1997/0370; COD/1997/0176; COD/1997/0067; COD/1996/0085; 
COD/1997/0146; COD/1995/0209; COD/1995/0080; COD/1994/0222; COD/1994/0135; COD/1993/0471; 
COD/1992/0426 
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Parliament or the Council common position. If the joint text adopted verbatim either 
version of the text, this amendment was labelled EP2 adopted or CP adopted. If the joint 
text modified either the Parliament’s or Council’s version without altering its substantive 
meaning, we labelled this amendment EP2 partially adopted or CP partially adopted.  
Where we could not determine easily whether the provision in the joint text was more 
similar to either one of the other two documents’ versions, we used three coding categories: 
a) Partially changed for circumstances where the joint text provision modified by less than 
40 percent of the wording of both the parliamentary and Council variant, b) Largely 
changed if the joint text provision modified by more than 40 percent such wording, and c) 
New/deleted when a new provision was introduced or both the Council’s and the 
Parliament’s variants were deleted. This classification scheme is illustrated in Table 2A.  
< TABLE 2A APPROX HERE > 
This classification scheme errs on the side of caution. Given the complexity of some legal 
texts, determining whether the changed provisions are more similar to the Council’s or the 
Parliament’s variant is not an easy task. Take the following example. Article 6(1) of the 
draft decision on AIDS prevention (COD/1994/0222) was subject to several modifications 
throughout legislative procedure. The text of the Council common position was: 
Article 6(1) In the course of implementing this programme, cooperation with non-member 
countries and with international organizations competent in the field of public health, in particular 
the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the Council of Europe. 
The Parliament in the second reading deleted the italicized text above and added the bold 
text below: 
Article 6(1) In the course of implementing this programme, cooperation with non-member 
countries and with international organizations in particular the United Nations, the World Health 
Organization, the Council of Europe, and non-governmental organizations competent in the 
field of public health or particularly involved in the fight against AIDS and the prevention 
thereof. 
Finally, the joint text deleted the italicized text of the parliamentary reading, restated the 
Council text (underlined below) and added the bold text: 
Article 6(1) In the course of implementing this programme, cooperation with non-member 
countries and with international organizations competent in the field of public health, especially the 
United Nations and in particular the World Health Organization, the Council of Europe and non-
governmental organizations, competent in the field of public health or particularly involved in the 
fight against AIDS and other communicable diseases and the prevention thereof. 
In this situation, we could not determine whether the conciliation committee took a position 
closer to either of the other two institutions. We therefore coded this subunit as ‘Partially 
changed’. We have been therefore rather conservative in deciding whether a text was closer 
to the position of one chamber in order to ensure an acceptable degree of intercoder 
reliability. We also replicated the coding several times in order to reduce subjective 
judgment and to make the procedure the most transparent and replicable as possible.  
For each dossier, we then produced three values: hEP2 is the sum of the number of 
modifications that have been coded EP2 adopted or EP2 partially adopted, hCP is the sum 
of the modifications coded CP adopted or CP partially adopted, hU is the sum of the 
remaining modifications. For each dossier d, bargaining success has been determined as 
follows: 
                     {
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Success is assigned to the institution that has managed to insert in the final document a 
relative majority of amendments that are identical or highly similar to its version of the text. 
Success cannot be determined if a relative majority of changes cannot be easily associated 
with the version of either the parliamentary reading or the common position. Table 3A 
illustrates the results of this exercise. Wordfish estimates coincide with the hand-coding 
estimates in nine out of the eleven dossiers where we can easily determine the winning 
institution through the hand-coding procedure. Wordfish estimates based on five documents 
perform instead more poorly. Only six dossiers display the same outcome as the one 
produced through hand-coding. 
< TABLE 3A APPROX HERE > 
Hand-coding and Wordfish based on three documents produce therefore similar estimates. 
Certainly, there is a group of dossiers where hand-coding is difficult but, in these 
circumstances, it is better to rely on the more reliable and easily replicable Wordfish 
procedure. 
Comparison with expert-interviews estimates 
Finally, we compare our estimates with those derived from expert surveys conducted by 
König et al. (2007). This study is based on 54 dossiers that reached conciliation between 
1999 and 2002. These dossiers comprise 74 issues on which there was disagreement 
between the two chambers. If we consider issues only, König et al. (2007) finds that the 
Parliament has succeeded in 56 percent of times, while the Council only in 26 percent. If 
we consider only dossiers having one conflicting issue, the Parliament succeeds 60 percent 
of times. Our Wordfish estimates for these 54 dossiers indicate instead that the Parliament 
is successful in only 39 percent of the cases. König et al. (2007) have cross-validated their 
estimates with the data available from the DEU project (Thomson et al. 2006), but the two 
datasets overlap only on seven issues. Clearly, these differences are glaring and should be 
subject to further research. 
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Table 1A: Frequency of parliamentary success (ω estimates based on five documents) 
    EP legislative term 
    IV V VI 
EP success 74 18 41 10 
N 179 59 86 23 
z-statistic -2.32 -2.99 -0.43 -0.63 
Pr (k>= EP success) 0.992 0.999 0.705 0.798 
Note: One-sided binomial probability tests; k is the expected frequency in case of H0=.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2A: Classification scheme for hand-coding modifications 
Can the joint text provision be easily associated with the relevant provision in either the 
reading of the Parliament or the Council common position? 
Yes 
Substantive meaning Labels 
EP2 Amendment is adopted verbatim EP2 adopted 
CP Amendment is adopted verbatim CP adopted 
EP2 Amendment is partially adopted EP2 partially adopted 
CP Amendment is partially adopted CP partially adopted 
No 
Less than 40% of the words of both texts modified  Partially changed 
More than 40% of the words of both texts modified Largely changed 
New text or both Council’s and EP’s versions removed New/deleted 
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Table 3A: Validity analysis of hand- and Wordfish-coding of bargaining success for twenty randomly selected dossiers 
 
Number of modifications                   Bargaining success 
EP 
adopted 
EP partially 
adopted 
CP 
adopted 
CP partially 
adopted 
Partially 
changed 
Largely 
changed 
New/ 
deleted 
Hand-coding Wordfish¹ 
COD/2005/0239 4 15 28 1 6 5 11 CoM CoM² 
COD/2005/0191 5 6 67 3 11 7 7 CoM CoM 
COD/2004/0175 11 3 2 1 11 9 3 undetermined EP² 
COD/2003/0168 0 1 15 1 4 6 2 CoM CoM 
COD/2001/0257 8 4 2 0 9 1 1 EP EP² 
COD/1998/0336 0 0 10 1 5 6 4 undetermined EP 
COD/1998/0289 2 1 10 1 1 4 4 CoM CoM² 
COD/1998/0195 2 1 7 2 4 5 3 undetermined CoM² 
COD/1997/0370 0 2 3 0 1 4 2 undetermined CoM² 
COD/1997/0176 5 2 1 0 2 0 0 EP EP² 
COD/1997/0067 0 6 11 1 5 0 2 CoM CoM 
COD/1996/0085 4 14 25 1 23 14 16 undetermined EP 
COD/1997/0146 3 2 4 0 6 0 2 undetermined CoM 
COD/1995/0209 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 CoM EP 
COD/1995/0080 2 0 2 1 4 0 0 undetermined EP 
COD/1994/0222 4 3 7 0 7 1 3 undetermined CoM 
COD/1994/0135 1 8 11 0 3 1 0 CoM CoM 
COD/1993/0471 0 0 6 1 1 0 0 CoM CoM 
COD/1992/0426 4 0 0 0 2 2 0 undetermined CoM 
COD/1992/0415 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 EP CoM² 
¹ EP if EP success = 1, CoM otherwise. ² Wordfish estimate employing five documents differs from the three-document estimate.
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